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remedy deficiencies in "the most applicable express jurisdictional
statute."
To the extent that jurisdiction is available, judicial review of im-
proper agency action is increased. 33 Some commentators feel that the
ameliorative. effects of such review warrant judicial construction of
the APA as a source of jurisdiction. 34 However, because a jurisdic-
tional expansion needs to be integrated with other statutory sources
of jurisdiction and involves many collateral issues which are not ade-
quately handled through the judiciary's piecemeal approach, decisive
legislation is most often3 and more appropriately advocated as the
proper solution:
[W]e are dealing with a problem that merits statutory clarification. . . as
to the jurisdictional basis for review . . . . If the cases make anything clear,
it is the desirability of Congressional action in this murky and troublesome
area.3 1
B. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In 1971 four diverse developments in the doctrine of sovereign
immunity' furthered a movement to limit or abrogate2 the doctrine's
33. See generally Berger, supra note 5, at 86, 93-95; McCarran, Improving "Administrative
Justice", Hearings and Evidence; Scope of Judicial Review, 32 A.B.A.J. 827, 893-94 (1946).
34. See DAvis (Supp. 1970) 789-92; JAFFEE 164-65; Byse & Fiocca 329-30.
35. See, e.g., Cramton 445, 468-70. Discussions of this solution, however, are usually di-
rected at eliminating only jurisdictional gaps caused by the minimum jurisdictional amount
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). See S. 3568, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1970) and S. 598, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). For a discussion of a proposal to amend the APA, see Pending
Proposals To Amend the Administrative Procedure Act:An Analysis of S. 518, 20 AD. L. REV.
185, 200-06 (1968).
36. Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390,400 (3d Cir. 1969) (concurring opinion).
1. The doctrine, simply stated, means that the United States may not be sued without its
consent. Historically, a variety of bases have been advanced in support of sovereign immunity,
but none can withstand a critical analysis. Justice Holmes suggested that a legal right cannot
exist against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. Kawanakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). However, this'is not persuasive since the federal govern-
ment has long obeyed the judgments of courts in cases involving legal rights asserted against it.
DAVIS (Supp. 1970) § 27.00-4, at 906-08. Hamilton argued that a suit against the government
lies outside a federal court's jurisdiction as defined by article III of the Constitution. THE
FEDERALIST No. 81, 567-68 (Dawson ed. 1867). See also Williams v. United States, 289 U.S.
553 (1933). See generally WRIGHT §§ 11, 22. The federal courts, in continually reviewing suits
to which the United States has consented, have never accepted Hamilton's argument. Id. § 22.
A third early argument for sovereign immunity was that it was a method by which the courts
could avoid bankrupting "a young and relatively impoverished federal . . . body politic."
Sherry, The Myth that the King Can Do No Wrong: A Comparative Study of the Sovereign
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bar to judicial review:' (1) the Tucker Act 4 was interpreted to allow
judicial review of government violations of rights conferred by Execu-
tive Orders and federal administrative regulations unless specifically
prohibited; 5 (2) section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)6 was increasingly recognized as an implied waiver of sovereign
immunity; 7 (3) an otherwise valid sovereign immunity bar was disre-
garded through use of a "balancing" test which weighed the benefits
of judicial review against those of sovereign immunity;' and (4) fur-
Immunity Doctrine in the United States and New York Court of Claims, 22 AD. L. REV. 39,
56 (1969). However, not only is this "a discredited relic of the past," id. at 57, but today it is
the citizen "who is becoming helpless in the face of growing governmental intrusion into his
very life." Id. at 58. Finally, it was argued that sovereign immunity reflected an inability of a
court to enforce its judgment against the government. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 397.
However, such reasoning would undermine all judicial review of federal legislation. Id. at 397
n. 39.
For a discussion of the justifications presently offered in defense of sovereign immunity, see
notes 22, 100 infra.
"Of major significance in the development of the confusion concerning the scope of the
doctrine is the fact that while the scope is largely determined by the basis arrived at, eminent
authorities have been totally unable to agree as to such basis . . . ." 16 VAND. L. REV. 231,
232 (1964). See also JAFFE 198 (suggesting that the doctrine developed as a matter of expediency
rather than abstract theory); Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 396-97.
2. Commentators have long attacked sovereign immunity as inequitable, confusing in oper-
ation, and lacking in justification. DAVIS (Supp. 1970) §§ 27.00 -.01; Byse, Proposed Reforms
in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties,
Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1479 (1962); Carrow, Sovereign Immunity in Administrative
Law-A New Diagnosis, 9 J. PUB. L. 1 (1960); Cramton, Nonstatutory Review419; 1969 Duke
Project 200. But it has been pointed out that sovereign immunity has been given increased
strength as a bar to judicial review during the last twenty-five years, DAVIS (Supp. 1970)
§ 27.00-2, at 900; H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1151 (1953); Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 417. However, it is the thesis of this
discussion that a gradually emerging movement attempting to curtail sovereign immunity can
be discerned from recent judicial opinions and legislative activity.
3. The nature of the bar imposed by sovereign immunity remains confused. Generally it is
considered a defect in subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Case v. Terrell, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
199 (1870); WRIGHT § 22. The doctrine is often viewed as a defect in personal jurisdiction, as
is illustrated when the United States is held to be an indispensable party. See, e.g., Mine Safety
Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945); Arnold v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 42,
43 (S.D. Tex. 1971). Occasionally, the bar will be considered as actually a defense on the merits.
See, e.g., General Motors v. Volpe, 321 F. Supp. 1112, 1120 (D. Del. 1970). However these
distinctions do not have an effect upon the operation of sovereign immunity law. See generally
Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 392, 399-400. But see note 12 infra.
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491 (1970).
5. Chambers v. United States, 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Allison v. United States, 451
F.2d 1035 (Ct. Cl. 1971). See notes 33-53 infra and accompanying text.
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 etseq. (1970).
7. See notes 54-70 infra and accompanying text.
8. Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1071). See notes 71-87 infra and accompanying
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ther legislative steps were taken to expressly abrogate sovereign im-
munity.' In order to provide a backdrop for these developments, a
brief three-step review of the present operation of sovereign immunity
law is helpful.10
First, when does sovereign immunity arise to bar judicial review?
Certainly it will be considered to arise if the United States is named
party-defendant." Moreover, regardless of the nominal party-
defendant and form of suit, sovereign immunity will arise"2 if the
judgment would operate against the United States, 3 "expend itself on
the public treasury or domain," 4 or "restrain the Government from
acting or . . .compel it to act."' 5 Since the courts liberally construe
the effect of a judgment,16 and sovereign immunity is routinely as-
serted by the Justice Department,1 7 the doctrine not only arises often
but can have drastic effects.' 8
The second step in a review of the doctrine is to ask whether
9. See S. 3568, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) and S. 598, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See
notes 89-103 infra and accompanying text.
10. "Present" sovereign immunity law began with Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). For a discussion of the charges wrought by Larson on the
operation of prior sovereign immunity law, see note 27 infra.
11. Cf. United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940).
12. Generally, in order for sovereign immunity to arise it must be asserted by the govern-
ment, since the doctrine will not necessarily be raised independently by the court. For a discus-
sion of cases where the Supreme Court exercised judicial review without raising sovereign
immunity on its own, see Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1213-14 (4th Cir. 1971), and Blaze
v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348, 1349 (5th Cir. 1971).
13. Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963).
14. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947).
15. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).
16. See, e.g., Kuhl v. Hampton, 326 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Mo. 1971). The action was brought
by mail handlers to compel the Postmaster General to allow them to compete for a new position.
A judgment for the plaintiffs would compel the federal government to consider a greater number
of applicants and sovereign immunity would therefore arise as a bar to review. See note 15 supra
and accompanying text. However in allowing the doctrine to arise and bar review the district
court did not find it necessary to consider the nature or extent of the resulting action thrust
upon the United States.
17. But see General Motors v. Volpe, 321 F. Supp. 1112, 1120 (D. Del. 1971). For a
discussion of the litigating practice of the Justice Department in asserting sovereign immunity,
see note 100 infra. See also Hearings on "'Sovereign Immunity" Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure o!the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 28-30 (1970). Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 420-21.
18. Sovereign immunity (I) often causes serious substantive injustice, (2) frequently
results in final determinations without the safeguards that are necessary for procedural
justice, and (3) causes gross inefficiency in the allocation of functions between officers
and agencies by preventing courts from resolving controversies they are especially quali-
fied to resolve. DAVIS (Supp. 1970) 896.
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sovereign immunity has been expressly waived by statute and if not,
whether it may be circumvented by the "officer suit." Waiver of
sovereign immunity, or consent to be sued, must be expressly legis-
lated by Congress 9 and, as a general rule, cannot be implied."' Fur-
ther, it is normally required that such consent be given by Congress
itself and not by a federal officer or agency.2 ' Statutory consent has
been given for most tort and contract suits, but in general has not been
given for other types of litigation brought against the government. 2
In order to prevent the injustice of completely unrestrained adminis-
trative action, courts have allowed the fiction of the "officer suit" to
circumvent sovereign immunity on the grounds that an "improperly"
acting official must be acting as a private person rather than as a
federal officer.23 Judicial review has been made available when the
19. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587-88 (1941); United States v. Shaw, 309
U.S. 495, 500-01 (1940); United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940).
20. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) (no waiver implied from the Declaratory
Judgment Act); White v. Administrator of GSA, 343 F.2d 444, 447 (9th Cir. 1965) (no waiver
implied from the Mandamus Act).
21. See cases cited note 19 supra.
22. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970); Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346, 1491 (1970) (money damages recoverable only). "Governmental responsibility both
in contract and in tort is now well established and in broad outline is totally successful." DAVIS
(Supp. 1970) 897; Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 393. However, unnecessary gaps do remain
in both of these areas; for example, in cases involving deliberate torts of governmental employees
and governmental contracts implied by law (quasi-contracts), there is immunity when suit is
brought again'st the government. DAVIS (Supp. 1970) 899; Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 393-
94. It is estimated that the tort and contract cases constitute two-thirds of the litigation brought
against the United States. Consequently, in the remaining litigation brought against the govern-
ment, such as enforcement of contracts, payment of public funds, and transfer of property
possessed by the United States, sovereign immunity is still a barrier to judicial review. Cramton,
Nonstatutory Review 402.
In suits seeking specific relief, sovereign immunity has a special viability. Mims v. United
States, 324 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Va. 1971), states the present rationale:
[Tihe necessity of permitting the Government to carry out its functions unhampered by
direct judicial intervention outweighs the possible disadvantage to the individual citizen
being relegated to the recovery of money damages after the event. Id. at 492.
"Specific relief' includes the remedies of "injunction, mandamus, declaratory judgment, eject-
ment, and specific performance." 1969 Duke Project 202 n.174. The explanation in Mims of
undue judicial interference remains the only respectable justification for the doctrine today.
Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 397; Byse, supra note 2, at 1484. See also Steadman, "Forgive
U.S. Its Trespasses?' Land Title Disputes With the Sovereign -Present Remedies and Pro-
spective Reform, 1972 DuKE L.J. 15, 20-21.
23. The suit is fictitious and illogical because the suit is always against the government. The
officer acted under assumed federal authority in pursuance of governmental interests and will
be defended by government lawyers. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 399.
[Vol. 1972:115
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W-1971
officer or federal agency has ac.ed in excess of statutory authority,?
failed to act while under a statutory duty to do S0,25 acted in an
unconstitutional manner, or acted pursuant to an unconstitutional
grant of authority.25 In relying upon these exceptions, the courts have
used a variety of approaches. 27 The officer suit has been criticized as
24. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701-02 (1949). The officer is acting ultra vires. See generally 3 DAVIS
§§ 27.01- 10.
25. Although not often stated as one of the officer suit exceptions, a failure to act is
generally recognized as one, since it is difficult to see any "valid distinction between the public
official who has a statutory duty to act and does not and the one who has a duty not to act
and does." Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 573 (9th Cir. 1971). Thus, where a statute
requires the officer to perform even a discretionary type of act and the officer refuses to comply
with the statute, a court can order him to perform the required act. However, the court cannot
order him to exercise the act in a particular manner. Furthermore, because the requested relief
under this exception will always require affirmative action upon the officer and federal govern-
ment, the suit is especially susceptible to the Larson provision, notes 30-32 infra and accompa-
nying text, and consequently it may still fail. See generally Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 414-
15.
26. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701-02 (1949). See generally 1969 Duke Project 202-03.
27. Under pre-Larson law, sovereign immunity was a bar to judicial review where the officer
acted pursuant to his valid statutory authority. However, where the petitioner alleged one of
the officer suit exceptions, the court would determine the extent of the authority or constitution-
ality of the officer's actions. If the officer acted within both of these criteria, sovereign immunity
was not circumvented and the suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, in so doing,
the court would find that the question of jurisdiction depended upon the question of the merits.
Success against a motion to dismiss meant success on the merits. Under post-Larson law,
however, the determination of jurisdiction and the merits are separated. Sovereign immunity
remains a bar whenever the pleadings show the officer had prima facie authority and no inquiry
will be made into the merits. See generally Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 401-04; Comment,
Immunity of Government Officers: Effect of the Larson Case, 8 STAN. L. REv. 683 (1956); 1969
Duke Project 203-04.
Under post-Larson law, a variety of approaches have been used in applying the officer suit
exceptions. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have developed an administrative discretion analysis.
Actions clearly within the officer's express statutory discretion cannot be judicially reviewed,
but otherwise sovereign immunity is not a bar. Furthermore, if the statute does not mention
discretion, it is presumed to be non-discretionary and thus any alleged failure to comply is
sufficient to circumvent the doctrine. See generally 1969 Duke Project 208-12. The use of this
approach continued in 197 1. See, e.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, - F.2d .-
(10th Cir. 1971) (the fact that the Secretary of the Interior was compelled by law to act in
accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act and that he failed to do so brought
the suit within the ultra vires exception); McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971)
(no ultra vires exception since the officer's acts were within the ambits of discretion given to
him by the Military Storage Act). See also Steadman, supra note 22, at 24-28.
A second approach, developed in the Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits, turns upon
the allegations in the petitioner's complaint.See generally 1969 Duke Project 212-14. Once the
ultra vires exception is properly pleaded, the threshhold bar of sovereign immunity is circum-
vented. Although this approach has been described as "virtually abandoning Larson's dual
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illogical and inconsistent,2 s but remains the major means of avoiding
the bar of sovereign immunity. 29
The third and final step in the review of the doctrine is to decide
whether sovereign immunity, once it arises, should remain a bar,
notwithstanding apparent availability of the officer suit. In the well
known footnote I1 of Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp.'3 the Supreme Court stated that if the result of a case would
be to force the government to take affirmative action, sovereign im-
munity could still bar the officer suit even though the officer had acted
unconstitutionally or in excess of his authority. This statement has
been subsequently modified to mean that relief will be denied where
the affirmative action would impose "an intolerable burden on gov-
ernmental functions. ' 31 The courts have been unclear in determining
under what circumstances the requested relief would be so burden-
some. Although frequently mentioning the footnote I1 caveat, the
courts have seldom found the burden on the government great enough
to prevent the use of the officer suit fiction.32
Expansion of Waiver Under the Tucker Act
Judicial relief for government racial discrimination which violates
executive orders has been foreclosed largely by the government's im-
positibn of sovereign immunity.33 However, in Chambers v. United
standard for determining jurisdiction and the merits," id. at 214, it does require precise pleading
by the litigant's lawyer and does not remove the burden of proof in winning on the merits. Id.
Both circuits continued to use this approach. See, e.g., Knox Hill Tenant Council v. Washing-
ton, 448 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1971). However, in the District of Columbia this is necessary
only where the APA and implied waiver are unavailable. See note 56 infra and accompanying
text.
28. DAVIS (Supp. 1970) § 27.01; Carrow, supra note 2, at 1-4, 8, 13; Cramton,
Nonstatutory Review 398-99.
29. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 398.
30. Of course, a suit may fail, as one against the sovereign, even if it is claimed that
the officer being sued has acted unconstitutionally or beyond his statutory powers, if the
relief requested cannot be granted by merely ordering the cessation of the conduct com-
plained of but will require iffirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of
unquestionably sovereign property. 337 U.S. 682, 691 n. 1I (1949) (emphasis added).
31. Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1318 (9th Cir. 1969). See generally Cramton,
Nonstatutory Review 414-17; 1969 Duke Project 214-16.
32. See, e.g., Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 572-73 (9th Cir. 1971); Washington v.
Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1317 (9th Cir. 1969). But see Knight v. United States, 443 F.2d 415 (2d
Cir. 1971) (where footnote 11 was construed broadly).
33. See Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93, 99 (6th Cir. 1971); Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d
1348, 1349 (5th Cir. 1971); Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1276-77 (8th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970); Congress of Racial Equality v. Comm'r, 270 F. Supp. 537
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States ,3 the Court of Claims overcame this apparently insurmounta-
ble jurisdictional bar by holding that Executive Order No. 11,4783
provided rights which could be enforced by awarding monetary relief
(D. Md. 1967). But see Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 333 F. Supp. 527, 529-30 (N.D. Cal.
1971) (where sovereign immunity was circumvented by the officer suit).
As the above cases indicate, suing the government for alleged racial discrimination. in its
hiring and promotion practices has been virtually impossible. A litigant must overcome several
substantial hurdles, including statutory jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, the question of review-
ability, proving the merits of his suit, and obtaining a satisfactory remedy. In Ogletree, Blaze,
and Gnotta sovereign immunity was the major barrier in preventing judicial review. In each of
these cases the petitioners exhausted their administrative remedies without a finding of racial
discrimination being made, and therefore sought review in a federal district court. In addition
to rejecting various implied waiver arguments, the courts refused to find the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970) applicable. See note 41 infra. Sovereign immunity was circum-
vented in Mow Sun but the question of reviewability would also have prevented the court from
reaching the merits.
In contrast, judicial review is readily available for suits brought by federal employees alleg-
ing wrongful dismissal. See Johnson & Stoll, Judicial Review of Federal Employee Dismissals
and Other Adverse Actions, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 178 (1972). Sovereign immunity does not
present any problems. Furthermore, jurisdiction for such claims is within the scope of the
Tucker Act, since they involve questions of government employment contracts. Id. at 186. But
see D. SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 125-27 (1970)
(such suits are founded upon a regulation of an executive department). However, dismissal cases
are impeded by scope of review problems. See note 45 infra.
34. 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
35. Executive Order No. 11,478, Equal Employment Opportunity In The Federal Govern-
ment, August 8, 1969, 3 C.F.R. 462 (1971), provides, in part, as follows:
Section 1. It is the policy of the Government of the United States to provide equal
opportunity in Federal employment for all persons, to prohibit discrimination in employ-
ment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and to promote the full
realization of equal employment opportunity through a continuing affirmative program
in each executive department and agency. This policy of equal opportunity applies to and
must be an integral part of every aspect of personnel policy and practice in the employ-
ment. development, advancement, and treatment of civilian employees of the Federal
Government.
Section 2. The head of each executive department and agency shall establish and
maintain an affirmative program of equal employment opportunty for all civilian em-
ployees and applicants for employment within his jurisdiction in accordance with the
policy set forth in section 1.. . . Id. at 463.
Executive Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965) has also been involved in suits
seeking judicial relief for government racial discrimination. See, e.g., Ogletree v. McNamara,
449 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1971). The two executive orders are nearly identical and both were
promulgated pursuant to an equal employment opportunity statute which provides:
It is the policy of the United States to insure equal employment opportunities for
employees without discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
The President shall use his existing authority to carry out this policy. 5 U.S.C. § 7151
(1970).
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in the Court of Claims and district courts under Tucker Act jurisdic-
tion. 6
Mrs. Chambers had been denied employment with a Social Secu-
rity Administration (SSA) district office because of an unverified
reference report which attributed to her what was characterized as
overzealous pursuit of equal employment rights.37 The Director of
Equal Employment Opportunity for HEW reversed a SSA hearing
officer's report of no discrimination and ordered that she be hired as
early as possible.38 Chambers was unsatisfied with merely obtaining
employment after the protracted hearings and sought to recover the
pay she had lost by not being hired in the first place. When this relief
36. For the Court of Claims:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress,
or any regulation of an executive department. . . .28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970).
For the district courts:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of
Claims, of:
(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000
in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regula-
tion of an executive department. . . Id. § 1346(a)(2).
In the Tucker Act, the United States has provided both a statutory source of jurisdiction
and express statutory consent to be sued. See National State Bank of Newark v. United States,
357 F.2d 704, 706 (Ct. Cl. 1966). Despite a literal reading of the statutory text, the Act is
available only to particular claims and therefore not every claim which is based upon the
Constitution, statute, or federal regulation will be cognizable in the Court of Claims or district
court. Eastport Steamship Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1967). In order
for a claim to come within the scope of section 1491 or 1346(a)(2), "what one must always ask
is whether the constitutional clause or the legislation which the claimant cites can fairly be
interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained."
Id. at 1009. The claim will be sufficient where monetary relief is expressly provided for. Id. at
1007. Furthermore, such relief may be established by implication, where the claim is not
frivolous but arguable. Ralston Steel Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 663, 667 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965). For a discussion of Tucker Act claims founded upon a regulation,
see SCHWARTZ & JACOBY, supra note 33, at 119-32. For a discussion of cases finding no
monetary relief implied in the federal regulations and statutes regarding equal employment in
the government, see notes 41 infra.
37. Chambers had been offered a position earlier with the SSA district office but declined
it in favor of another position at a local hospital. Two years later she resigned and again sought
employment with the SSA. However, the reference report submitted by the hospital described
her as one "not adverse to frivolously alleging racial discrimination and calling in the
NAACP." 451 F.2d at 1047.
38. The original finding of no discrimination was based solely upon the fact that another
black person had been hired for the position she was seeking. At the EEO hearing the finding
was reversed since the SSA had failed to show data on the racial composition of its office and
that it had not discriminated against Mrs. Chambers. Id. at 1048.
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was denied by both the Director of EEO and the reviewing Civil
Service Commission Board of Appeals and Review, she brought an
action for money damages in the Court of Claims for the pay missed
because of the discrimination. 39 The government conceded both that
she had been discriminated against and that the discrimination had
prevented her employment as a GS-4,40 but contended that, as held in
Gnotta v. United States4 1 Executive Order No. 11,478 did not and
could not expressly confer the right to seek a judicial remedy under
Tucker Act jurisdiction. The court rejected this contention, citing
cases wherein it had awarded backpay to government employees who
39. The procedure for the consideration of such complaints includes at least one review
within the executive department or agency and an appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
See § 104 of Executive Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965), and § 4 of Executive
Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 462, 464 (1971). The specified procedure does not provide for
subsequent judicial review by a federal court.
40. Apparently the issue was conceded in order to avoid a precedent as to the meaning of
discrimination under the Executive Order. See 451 F.2d at 1049. However, both of the dissenting
judges argued that the facts were insufficient to show racial discrimination. Id. at 1058-63, 1086-
91.
41. 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970). Gnotta held that
sovereign immunity barred the court from proceeding to the question of reviewability or to the
merits. However, Gnotta also rejected any statutory jurisdiction and consent to be sued by the
United States under the Tucker Act even though the suit was based upon a claim that Executive
Order No. 11,246 was violated. Claims based upon such executive orders are considered insuffi-
cient for purposes of the Tucker Act since:
Executive Order No. 11,246 enunciates government policy. . . ; imposes that policy
on the head of each executive department and agency; and directs the Civil Service
Commission to "supervise and provide leadership and guidance," to provide for the
impartial consideration of all complaints of discrimination, for at least one impartial
review within the department, and for appeal to the Commission. . . . But none of the
Executive Order's language speaks in terms of money damages or of a money claim
against the United States. 415 F.2d at 1278. See also SCHWARTZ & JACOBY, supra note
33, at 119-21.
Furthermore, Gnotta expressly stated that the claim would not be sufficient for purposes of the
Tucker Act even if discrimination was in fact found:
None of the executive orders or regulations which the complaint cites purports to confer
any right on an employee of the United States to institute a civil action for damages
against the United States, in the event of their violation, even if it should be established
that plaintiff's failure to have been promoted . . . was in fact due to discrimination in
violation of the Executive Orders pleaded. 415 F.2d at 1278.
Since jurisdiction of the Court of Claims for such claims is based on an identical statute (except
for jurisdictional amount), see note 36 supra, Gnotta should have equal applicability to the
Court of Claims. But cf. SCHWARTZ & JACOBY, supra note 33, at 94-96 (jurisdictional findings
of district courts must conform to those of the Court of Claims). A circuit court of appeals
has also rejected this type of claim as a basis for jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. See Blaze
v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348, 1349 (5th Cir. 1971); cf. Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93 (6th
Cir. 1971). Gnotta has been severely criticized. See generally DAvis (Supp. 1970)904; Cramton,
Nonstatutory Review 389-9 1; 1969 Duke Project 206-07.
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had been discharged in violation of other administrative regulations
which had provided no express judicial remedy. 2 Concluding that the
President must be assumed to have been aware of this precedent,4 3 the
court held that the absence of an express denial of judicial remedies
under Executive Order No. 11,478 implied an intent that judicial relief
be allowed.
By finding jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, albeit via implica-
tion from the silence of the Executive Order regarding judicial reme-
dies, the Court of Claims circumvented the bar which would ordinar-
ily be raised by the sovereign immunity doctrine, since the Tucker Act
provides consent to be sued.4 The court was then presented with the
question of reviewability, a question considered only in dicta in prior
hiring and promotion discrimination cases because of the sovereign
immunity bar.4" Since the government had conceded the discrimina-
tion and determined the level to which Chambers would have been
hired, there was no further administrative discretion to be exercised
before an award could be determined, and the court was therefore not
precluded by reviewability standards. In prior cases courts had been
reluctant to exercise the power of judicial review since they would have
had to decide at what level the applicant would have been hired or to
what level he should have been promoted. While this problem did
not confront the court in Chambers, in a companion case, Allison v.
United States,47 the court solved this reviewability problem by sus-
pending judicial proceedings until the necessary administrative find-
ings were made as to the grade to which the litigants would have been
42. E.g., Simon v. United States, 113 Ct. CI. 182, 190-91 (1949). Chambers attempted to
distinguish Gnotta as not having considered or cited Court of Claims cases such as Simon. The
other purported distinction of Gnotta was its lack of prior necessary administrative determina-
tions, see text accompnying note 48 infra, which were present in Chambers. As is discussed in
note 49 infra, these distinctions are unpersuasive.
43. 451 F.2d at 1052.
44. See note 36 supra.
45. See note 33 supra. For a discussion of reviewability in suits alleging wrongful dismissal,
see Johnson & Stoll, supra note 33, at 182-88 (finding the scope of review quite limited).
46. See, e.g., Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1276 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 934 (1970); Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 333 F. Supp. 527, 529-30 (W.D. Cal. 1971).
47. 451 F.2d 1035 (Ct. Cl. 1971). The process of suspending the proceedings until a more
adequate administrative record is obtained has been used prior to Allison. See Brenner, Judicial
Review by Money Judgment in the Court of Claims, 21 FED. B.J. 179, 181 n.7 (1961). The Court
of Claims lacks jurisdiction to remand for further administrative proceedings. Id. However, a
district court could properly remand the case to the administrative agency. See Johnson & Stoll,
note 33 supra, at 187.
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hired or promoted. Chambers and Allison thus appear to permit
judicial relief, but only where there are administrative findings that:
(1) there was discrimination violating an Executive Order; (2) the
litigant would have been hired or promoted but for the discrimination;
and (3) the litigant would have been hired or promoted to a designated
position ."
As vigorously noted by the dissent, the majority's avoidance of the
sovereign immunity bar encounters two problems. First and most
obvious is the weak rationale used to find the right to judicial relief
implied by the executive order.4 9 Second, by finding jurisdiction
through a combination of Executive Order No. 11,478 and the Tucker
Act, the court in effect allowed the Executive to waive sovereign
immunity. Only the legislature may give consent to be sued50 and,
since the authorizing statute did not give such consent, the Executive
was not empowered to do so.51
48. Apparently, even under Chambers and Allison the court is not to determine whether
there was discrimination which affected a decision to hire or promote. Although these issues
are directed at the question of reviewability, they may be related to the sufficiency of the claim
within the meaning of the Tucker Act. For example, it could be argued that a claim will not
fall within the Tucker Act's jurisdictional scope unless it is based upon an administrative finding
of discrimination. A mere allegation of discrimination is not sufficient. See text accompanying
notes 52-53 infra and note 36 supra.
Furthermore, Chambers and Allison did not completely rule out the possibility of reaching
the merits of a racial discrimination claim. For example, where the issue of discrimination is
reviewable, the clear implication of Chambers is that a court may go on to determine the merits.
Cf. DAvis (Supp. 1970) 904-05. See also text accompanying notes 52-53 infra.
49. The majority opinion relied on cases which were factually distinguishable from
Chambers and Allison, since they involved illegal discharge of government employees. See note
33 supra. Second, the majority in relying upon the implication found in Simon, note 42 supra,
did not mention or distinguish the holding of Eastport Steamship Corp. v. United States, 372
F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1967), which required that any implication from the statute, regulation or
order must be mandated. See note 36 supra. "Violation of a statute or nonfulfillment of a
statutory scheme does not of itself create a legal claim in a private claimant; it may violate only
a duty to the public." SCHWARTZ & JACOBY, note 33 supra, at 120. Also, it is unlikely that the
President and Congress would have been aware of such cases as Simon and still leave judicial
review to be implied by the Court of Claims. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. Rather,
the President and Congress would probably have made express provision for judicial review in
order to remove any doubt about such relief. Moreover, as is indicated in Gnotta, the absence
of an express judicial review provision and the text of the executive order providing for the
administrative reviewing procedure, see notes 39,41 supra, would seem to indicate only adminis-
trative relief was intended. Lastly, Gnotta expressly held the claim would not be sufficient even
if discrimination did in fact occur. 415 F.2d at 1277.
50. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text. However, it might be argued that Con-
gress had delegated its power of consent to be sued to the Executive via the equal employment
opportunity statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7151 (1970). Under such an analysis, consent to be sued in a
federal regulation might be upheld, although not expressly given in a statute by Congress.
51. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
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Chambers and its compansion case Allison are significant in sev-
eral respects. First, the decisions give rise to an apparent conflict
between the Court of Claims and other federal courts with regard to
whether a violation of Executive Order No. 11,478 falls within the
scope of the Tucker Act and thereby removes the sovereign immunity
bar. In addition, the rationale used by the Court of Claims can be
criticized and both Chambers and Allison leave many unanswered
questions.5 Since the findings were conceded by the government in
Chambers and were not denied in Allison, one may wonder in the
following situations whether there is a sufficient claim to fall within
the Tucker Act, and whether such claim is of a reviewable type: (1)
when the Government denies the discrimination; (2) when there are
conflicting administrative findings of no discrimination; or (3) when
the agencies consistently hold that no discrimination occurred. Fur-
thermore, can the court find discrimination as a matter of law and
then suspend the proceedings, as in Allison, for the necessary findings
prior to awarding a remedy? However, the decisions have a signifi-
cant, desirable result. Sovereign immunity is no longer a bar to suits
seeking judicial review of government racial discrimination and the
court can now screen cases under the more appropriate concept of
reviewability. Such a result, which ultimately will lead to a review of
the merits, has long been advocated.53
Implied Waiver by the A PA
Courts have increasingly abrogated sovereign immunity by
construing the APA as an implied waiver. 54 Recognized in the Court
52. For a discussion of the weakness in the majority opinion, see notes 36,49 supra.
53. DAvIs (Supp. 1970) 904. While the Chambers decision may reach a just result, its shaky
judicial reasoning indicates all the more justification for express legislative solutions to the
problem of sovereign immunity.
54. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151, 154 (D. Kan. 1971), af/don other
grounds, - F.2d - (10th Cir. 1971); School Bd. of Okaloosa Co. v. Richardson, 332 F.
Supp. 1263, 1268 (N.D. Fla. 1971); Schroeder Nursing Care, Inc. v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,
311 F. Supp. 405, 409 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F.
Supp. 809, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See also cases cited in notes 55 and 56 infra.
For cases where waiver was originally found but the circuit has subsequently reversed its
position, see note 67 infra. Commentators have also reached conflicting results. Compare
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUMi. L. Rav. 55, 91-93 (1965)
(finding waiver) and Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 417-18 n.143 (recognizing the possibility
but expressing doubts) with Byse & Fiocca 330 (implying no waiver result).
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit,55 the implied waiver theory is now
also fully accepted by the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit. 6 The leading District of Columbia case is Scanwell
Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,57 noted primarily as a case on stand-
ing.5 In Scanwell an unsuccessful bidder on a FAA contract brought
suit to have the contract award declared null and void, alleging agency
action which violated government contracting statutes. Although sov-
ereign immunity would normally have barred the suit, the court held
that Congress had implied a waiver of sovereign immunity in section
10 of the APA, noting that "any other construction would make the
review provisions illusory." 59 Section 10 specifically provides that any
person adversely affected by agency action is entitled to judicial re-
view. 0 Other courts have reached the same result through an alterna-
tive rationale. These courts have viewed sovereign immunity as a
subject matter jurisdictional defect and then, holding that the APA
is an independent source of statutory jurisdiction which cures subject
matter jurisdictional defects, have proceeded to hold that the APA
cures the jurisdictional defect of sovereign immunity."1
Other considerations also support construing section 10 of the
APA as an implied waiver of sovereign immunity. First, the require-
55. Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 1969); Krawez v. Stans, 306 F. Supp.
1230, 1233 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (alternative holding). See also 1969 Duke Project 216.
56. Knox Hill Tenants Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(concurring opinion); Lodge 1858, AFGE v. Paine, 436 F.2d 882, 893 n.69 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Lombard Corp. v.
Resor, 321 F. Supp. 687, 692-93 (D.D.C. 1970); Schoonmaker v. Resor, 319 F. Supp. 933, 940
(D.D.C. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 445 F.2d 726 (1971). See also IWW v. Clark, 385 F.2d
687, 693 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 948 (1968). But see Arizona v. Hobby,
221 F.2d 498, 500 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
57. 4 24 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
58. See 1970 Duke Project 190 n.96; 19 KANSAS L. Rav. 558 (1971).
59. 424 F.2d at 874. See also Byse, note 2 supra, at 1511.
60. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(b), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
61. See, e.g., School Bd. of Okaloosa, Co. v. Richardson, 332 F. Supp. 1263, 1267-68 (N.D.
Fla. 1971); Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 834 (E.D. Pa.
1968). Under the curing of jurisdictional defects view, "independent source of jurisdiction" and
"waiver of sovereign immunity" may be used interchhngeably. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review
424; 1969 Duke Project 216 n.282. However, a second view considers these two concepts
distinguishable. Id.; Berger, supra note 54, at 92 n.199 (1965); Byse & Fiocca 330. Under this
latter view, conflicting results are advocated. Compare Berger, supra (APA is a waiver but is
not an independent source of jurisdiction) with Byse &. Fiocca, .'upra (APA is an independent
source of jurisdiction but no waiver should be implied).
For a discussion of the APA as an independent source of statutory jurisdiction, see pp. 227-
33 supra and accompanying text.
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ments to be met before review is allowed under the APA would pro-
tect those governmental interests supposedly guarded by sovereign
immunity," so that wholesale interference with governmental opera-
tions would be avoided. Second, any increase in judicial review of
administrative action by construing the APA as an implied waiver
would deter administrative arbitrariness and thus fulfill a basic policy
objective of administrative law.13 Third, judicial action in construing
a waiver of sovereign immunihy may serve as a catalyst to spur the
legislature into enacting much needed legislation.6 Finally, the waiver
theory "possesses the virtues of simplicity and ease of application,"65
and therefore is preferable to the present erratic and confusing law on
sovereign immunity. 6
However, contrary to the positions taken by the Courts of Appeals
for the Second and District of Columbia Circuits, the weight of au-
thority holds that sovereign immunity operates independently of the
judicial review provisions of the APA,17 and the arguments against
62. A litigant must first show that the APA applies. See, e.g., Hooper v. United States,
331 F. Supp. 1056 (D. Conn. 1971) (APA not applicable where money damages are sought).
Secondly, in order for the judicial review section to become operative, review must not be
precluded by statute nor involve a matter of agency discretion. Administrative Procedure Act
§ 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970).
63. See Berger, supra note 54, at 93.
64. The court can best fulfill its role by enunciating a decision which will serve as a
catalyst to legislative action and as an interim solution to the many problems which will
undoubtedly arise due to a change in a long established policy of governmental immunity.
Comment, The Role of the Courts in Abolishing Governmental Immunity, 1964 DUiKE
L.J. 888, 892.
65. Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1212 (4th Cir. 1971).
66. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 418.
67. The First, Fourth and Eighth circuits have rejected implied waiver outright. Littell v.
Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1212 (4th Cir. 1971); Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1276
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1969); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota
Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1967); Cyrus v. United States, 226 F.2d 416, 417
(1st Cir. 1955). The Fifth Circuit originally held there was waiver, Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d
690, 698 (5th Cir. 1961) but has since reversed its position, Colson v. Hickel, 428 F.2d 1046.
1050 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971). But see Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348,
1349 (5th Cir. 1971). Earlier decisions in the Ninth Circuit had also found implied waiver,
Converse v. Udall, 399 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1025 (1969); Mulry
v. Driver, 366 F.2d 544, 549 (9th Cir. 1966); Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190, 193 (9th
Cir.), rev'd 390 U.S. 599 (1966); Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 34 (9th Cir. 1958), but it too
has recently reversed its position. Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 573 (9th Cir. 1971);
Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1320 (9th Cir. 1969). Similarly the Tenth Circuit formerly
held there was waiver, Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803, 805 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
975 (1967), but changed its position in Motah v. United States, 402 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 1968).
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waiver are substantial. Under the general rules of statutory construc-
tion, waiver of sovereign immunity must be express and not implied
and it is clear that the APA contains no such express language."8
Moreover, in dictum the Supreme Court has stated, "[s]till less is the
[APA] to be deemed an implied waiver, of all governmental immunity
from suit."69 Finally, the legislative, rather than the judicial forum,
is better equipped to provide a comprehensive and uniform solution
to the problem of sovereign immunity."
The Balancing Approach of Littell v. Morton
In Littell v. Morton,71 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that, although sovereign immunity was fully applicable to the
case, judicial review could not be barred unless "the underlying poli-
cies of the doctrine of sovereign immunity are so strong . . . as to
require dismissal .... ,,72 Littell was employed as general counsel for
the Navajo Indian Tribe under a contract with the Department of the
Interior. After sixteen years under the contract the Secretary of the
Interior threatened termination, charging Littell with misconduct in
his relations with the Tribe. Littell attempted to enjoin the Secretary
from terminating the contract but, after protracted litigation, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that Littell had
breached the contract 73 and the Secretary immediately cancelled it.71
While the contract dispute was being litigated Littell continued to
But see National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151, 154 (D. Kan.) (finding implied
waiver), affd, - F.2d - (10th Cir. 1971) (finding alternative grounds to allow judicial
review).
68. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970). For a discussion
of statutory consent by the United States to be sued, see notes 19-22 supra and accompanying
text. Also, the legislative history does not support the waiver position. See generally Dickinson
546. But see Berger, note 54 supra, at 92 (arguing that the "no waiver" position is a self-
defeating construction contrary to the intent of the legislative history of the APA).
69. Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 515-16 (1962). Furthermore, in at least five cases
the Supreme Court has held without any discussion of the APA that sovereign immunity barred
review of administrative decisions. Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963); Fresno v. California,
372 U.S. 627 (1963); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Larson v. Domestic and Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). See also Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1212-14 (4th
Cir. 1971).
70. See Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 418.
71. 445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971).
72. Id. at 1214.
73. Udall v. Littell, 338 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1964); 366 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967).
74. Udall v. Littell, 366 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967).
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serve as general counsel but the Secretary refused to pay for those
services. After the termination of the original dispute Littell brought
a second action to compel the Secretary to pay for those services
rendered from the date of the original suit to the date when the court
of appeals finally determined his misconduct. The district court con-
cluded that sovereign immunity barred it from taking jurisdiction
and, alternatively, that the Secretary's disapproval of the claims was
an exercise of discretionary power and not reviewable under the
APA. 75
The court of appeals agreed that normally sovereign immunity
should bar judicial review because a judgment for Littell would re-
quire the government to pay money. Circumvention by the officer suit
was not available since the Secretary's actions were constitutional and
clearly within his statutory authority. Although it might be argued
that Littell had been deprived of property without due process of law
and therefore the constitutional exception was applicable, Judge Win-
ter concluded that Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce
Corp.76 precluded any fifth amendment argument based on contract
rights. Moreover, in a well reasoned analysis, Judge Winter rejected
the theory of implied waiver by the APA.77
The court then proceeded to weigh the benefits of allowing judicial
review against preclusion of review by sovereign immunity.78 Judge
75. Littell v. Hickel, 314 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Md. 1970). The circuit court found the Secre-
tary's actions to be discretionary but reversed the non-reviewable action, declaring that "the
APA provides limited judicial review to determine if there was an abuse of that discretion."
445 F.2d at 1211.
76. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
77. See also notes 54-70 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of implied waiver of
sovereign immunity by the APA.
78. Since Judge Winter went through an analysis of present sovereign immunity law first,
Littell appears to add a fourth step in the operation of sovereign immunity law. For a discussion
of the prior three steps see notes 10-32 supra and accompanying text. Consequently, a court
need never apply the balancing approach if (1) sovereign immunity does not arise or (2) the
doctrine can be circumvented. One unanswered question, however, is whether or not the balanc-
ing approach should be applied when the Larson proviso operates to prevent the apparent
availability of the officer suit, thus barring review. For a discussion of the Larson proviso, see
notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text. Presumably, a suit should be barred under the Larson
proviso but judicial review could still be allowed under the Littell analysis.
Other commentators have suggested balancing type approaches similar to that used in
Littell. See DAVIS (Supp. 1970) § 27 (asking who is the sovereign and what are the sovereign's
interests); Carrow, note 2 supra, at 10-21 (finding four criteria: form of proceeding; nature of
administrative action; type of interest affected; and character of agency sued).
It can be argued that these types of approaches, including Littell, are shifting away from
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Winter listed and evaluated a number of factors: (1) the degree of
interference with governmental programs caused by review; (2) the
nature of the governmental program or agency; (3) the extent to which
agency expertise would be supplanted by review; and (4) the appropri-
ateness of judicial review to the individual case. The court considered
these factors79 and found they favored judicial review of Littell's
case.
8 0
Littell can be viewed as an intermediate judicial position on sover-
eign immunity. It represents the most a court can do without fully
abrogating the doctrine"' or, alternatively, accepting the constraints
of present sovereign immunity law.12 The balancing approach denies
judicial review only where positive harm to the government would
result, and seeks to delineate in a forthright analysis the limits in
reviewing governmental action. 83 However, the Littell approach does
the doctrine of sovereign immunity to an anlaysis of reviewability. In fact, it has been observed
that sovereign immunity was a primitive judicial device aimed at reviewability and that today
the doctrine is unnecessary since there are more sophisticated methods to govern judicial review.
Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 425-26. If this is so, the balancing approach should be used in
and of itself (without the prior reliance upon sovereign immunity law employed in Littell) as a
reviewability analysis.
79. An additional factor should be included in the Littell approach. Davis states that "there
is lack of incentive to provide the kind of procedural safeguards that courts would insist upon
if sovereign immunity did not cut off review." DAVIS (Supp. 1970). Thus, a court in weighing
the advantages of judicial review should consider the need for a judicial incentive to force
agencies to provide adequate procedural safeguards. Cf. id. § 27.01.
80. Another 1971 sovereign immunity case illustrates a situation where the balancing ap-
proach would reach the opposite result and allow the doctrine to bar judicial review. In Ogletree
v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1971), Black employees at the Wright Patterson Air Force
Base brought a class action alleging racial discrimination in the employment practices at the
base. The circuit court did not use a balancing approach in dismissing the suit on sovereign
immunity grounds. However, two factors were mentioned by the court which would seem to
weigh heavily under a Littell approach in denying judicial review. First, all employee promotions
would be temporarily halted. Presumably, this could be considered an unnecessary degree of
interference by the judiciary with a vital governmental program (defense facilities). Second, a
district court would be required to supervise the hiring, promotion and termination of all
employees. Judicial review would certainly be inappropriate in view of the resulting action thrust
upon the district court. Furthermore, it might be argued that the process within the Department
of Defense in determining and remedying racial discrimination may be quite satisfactory. There-
fore, Ogletree would likely affirm using a Littell approach.
81. See notes 54-67 supra and accompanying text.
82. See notes 10-32 supra and accompanying text.
83. Courts have a responsibility to provide a rationale, as opposed to a doctrinal basis for
resolving disputes between the government and the individual. Carrow, supra note 2, at 22-23.
See Byse, note 2 supra, at 1490-91 (finding most courts are encouraged by Larson and its
progeny to shirk such a task).
Vol. 1972:115]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
cause long run costs of its own." A lack of uniformity and consistency
will result from the differing attitudes of each court concerning the
desirability of judicial review of administrative activities.85 The analy-
sis may be distorted by a bias to compare a single litigant's interest
against a range of governmental interests.8" In addition, the balancing
approach is unnecessary since there are more justifiable methods to
screen out undesirable judicial review.8 7 However, Littell may be bene-
ficial as a temporary solution pending the enactment of more appro-
priate legislation.
Legislative Attempts to Abrogate Sovereign Immunity
Legislation has long been urged as a method to abrogate sovereign
immunity,88 but it is only since 1969 that active steps have been pur-
sued in Congress. Two reasons may account for the recent legislative
activity: as administrative activity becomes more visible, unjust re-
sults caused by the doctrine also become more visible; and, legislation
is viewed as more desirable than judicial intervention:
The legislature, with its public forum and investigative machinery, is better
equipped than the courts to outline the desired scope of government liability.
A judicial decision necessarily lacks the political comprehensiveness of a legis-
lative enactment, for the court must primarily address itself to a limited fact
situation. Furthermore, a court decree is usually retrospective and effects rights
established before the decision date. Thus, far reaching and uncertain conse-
quences may result when judicial rather than legislative abrogation is used.A
Currently, an amendment to section 10(a) of the Administrative Pro-
84. For a discussion of the long run costs involved in utilizing the fictitious officer suit to
circumvent sovereign immunity, see Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 399.
85. For a discussion of how much leeway such a broad and indefinite test would give to a
court, see Byse, supra note 2, at 1492-93.
86. Sovereign immunity law has a propensity to work a greater injustice on the "small
plaintiffs." See Hearings, supra note 17, at 24.
87. Such methods would include dismissal for lack of ripeness, failure to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies, lack of standing, and nonreviewability. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 425.
88. 3 DAVIS ch. 27; JAFFE 197-98, 213-31, 229 n.123; Byse, supra note 2, at 1479; Carrow,
supra note 2, at 23; Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pt. II), 36 U.
CHI. L. REv. 268, 290 (1969). See generally Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 417-20, 428-36
(suggesting Congress act in view of the absence of judicial reform).
Moreover, Professor Davis has also suggested that legislative reform is not necessary if the
courts would return to the foundation cases and merely reach consistent, rational and just
results. DAvis (Supp. 1970) § 27.01. See also 1969 Duke Project 217.
89. Comment, The Role of the Courts in Abolishing Governmental Immunity, 1964 DuKE
L.J. 888, 891. See also Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 418.
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cedure Act9" is the only actively pursued legislation abrogating sover-
eign immunity. The amendment was originally formulated in 1969 by
the Administrative Conference of the United States, and the Adminis-
trative Law Section of the American Bar Association9 and was ap-
proved in principle in February, 1970 by the House of Delegates of
the Bar Association.12 In March of that year Senator Edward Ken-
nedy introduced a bill93 identical to the Administrative Conference's
proposal and hearings on that bill were held in June before the Sub-
committee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary.94 However, no action was taken by the
Senate. 5 In February 1971 Senator Kennedy reintroduced the pro-
posed amendment96 which was reported from the subcommittee to the
full Judiciary Committee in July, 1971 .7 Prospects of further action
are unknown. 8 The amendment has many strong proponents99 but the
Justice Department has opposed the bill.1 "
90. 5 U.S.C. § 701 etseq. (1970).
91. Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation No. 9-Statutory
Reform of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine (Oct. 22, 1969).
92. DAvis (Supp. 1970) § 27.00-8.
93. S. 3568, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
94. Hearings on S. 3568 Before the Sub com. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
95. No action at all has been taken in the House of Representatives.
96. S. 598, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
97. Letter from Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate to the Duke
Law Journal, Dec. 14, 1971.
98. Id.
99. See Hearings, supra note 17, at 6-64, 245-54. See also DAVIS (Supp. 1970) § 27; Cram-
ton, Nonstatutory Review 428-36; 1969 Duke Project 218-20.
100. Hearings 64-75. In addition to preventing undue judicial interference with the govern-
ment, see note 22 supra, a second justification for sovereign immunity is offered by the Justice
Department: the doctrine screens out unmeritorious suits, thereby preventing the federal govern-
ment from being subjected to a burdensome and costly plethora of suits. This rational is
reflected in the practice of the Department since the doctrine is asserted in such areas as
agricultural relations, government employment, tax investigation, postal matters, administra-
tion of labor legislation, control of subversive activities, food and drug, and grant-in-aid pro-
grams. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 427-28. However, this second justification is unpersu-
asive. First, sovereign immunity is likely to be asserted to dismiss meritorious as well as
unmeritorious claims, since "[g]overnment lawyers are not unlike other lawyers in that they like
to win cases in which they are involved." Id. Second, determining whether a suit is meritorious
is a function more appropriately left to the courts than to the Justice Department. Third, the
apprehension of greater litigation is an exaggerated fear of the unknown; present litigation is
not crippling and the cost of bringing a suit eliminates a great deal of litigation. Id. Finally,
assertion of sovereign immunity is unnecessary, since there are other methods to screen out
litigation, id., and is inappropriate because
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The proposed amendment would waive sovereign immunity only
in matters covered by the APA and only in suits not prohibited by
the exceptions to the judicial review provision.'0' The limitations on
relief in statutes already granting waiver would not be changed nor
would defenses available to the government be affected.' It is gener-
ally agreed that the proposed statute would not result in undue judicial
interference with governmental operations and it is viewed as the most
appropriate method to abrogate sovereign immunity. 0
VII. JUDICIAL REVIEW-STANDING
THE DATA PROCESSING STANDARD AND THE RETURN OF DISCRETION-
ARY FACTORS
In spite of recent attempts by the Supreme Court to clarify and
redefine the doctrine of standing,' the lower courts still appear to be
immersed in the complexity and confusion which has historically
plagued this area of federal law.2 To a large extent many of these
the additional burden on government lawyers can be justified on the same basis as is
judicial review in general-the desirability of a judicial determination of the legality of
official action. The ideal of a government under law can be realized only if persons are
provided with an adequate set of judicial remedies against that government, its officials
and its agencies. Id. at 428.
101. Administrative Procedure Act, § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970). To this extent, the
amendment and the theory of implied waiver are quite similar. See note 62 supra. However,
the amendment is preferable since it expressly deals with many other issues in regard to sovereign
immunity which are never considered in the implied waiver theory. For example, the amendment
would eliminate the prior problems encountered by litigants in naming the proper party defen-
dant when suing the government. See S. 3568, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) and S. 598, 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). See generally Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 449-59. For a discussion
of separate legislation waiving sovereign immunity in suits involving land title disputes with the
United States, see Steadman, supra note 22, at 45-79.
102. DAVIS (Supp. 1970) § 27.00-8; Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 418; 1969 Duke
Project 218-20.
103. DAVIS (Supp. 1970) § 27.00-8; Cramton, Nonstatutory Review 425; 1969 Duke
Project 218-20.
1. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co.,
390 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1968).
2. The law of standing has been characterized as a "complicated specialty of federal juris-
diction." United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). It has also been
called "one of the most amorphous concepts in the entire domain of the public law. That this
statement is undoubtedly true is evidenced by the mental gymnastics through which the courts
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